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INTENTIONS, COMPLIANCE, AND
FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS∗
Stephen R. Galoob
University of Tulsa College of Law
Ethan J. Leib
Fordham Law School
This essay investigates the structure of fiduciary obligations, specifically the obliga-
tion of loyalty. Fiduciary obligations differ from promissory obligations with respect
to the possibility of “accidental compliance.” Promissory obligations can be satis-
fied through behavior that conforms to a promise, even if that behavior is done for
inappropriate reasons. By contrast, fiduciary loyalty necessarily has an intentional
dimension, one that prevents satisfaction through accidental compliance. The inten-
tional dimension of fiduciary loyalty is best described by what we call the “shaping”
account. This account both explains the conscientiousness that loyalty demands and
improves on other accounts of the intentional dimension of loyalty. Our analysis
challenges two of the most prominent ways of conceptualizing fiduciary obligations.
“Contractarianism” configures fiduciary obligations as a species of contractual duties.
The view that we call “proscriptivism” reduces fiduciary obligations to the juridical
prohibitions that apply to fiduciaries. Neither of these approaches is satisfactory,
because each neglects the intentional dimension of fiduciary loyalty.
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a prominent tradition, sometimes called “contractarianism,” that
reduces fiduciary obligations to promissory obligations.1 Debates over the
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1. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 38 J.L. & ECON.
438 (1993); John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625
(1995); Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and
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contractarian approach raise questions about the nature of fiduciary obli-
gations. Does the structure of fiduciary obligation ultimately differ from
that of promissory obligation? Contractarianism succeeds as an account of
fiduciary obligation only if fiduciary and promissory obligations have the
same underlying structure.
We argue that there is at least one important structural difference between
fiduciary obligations and promissory obligations: fiduciary obligations have
intentional requirements that promissory obligations do not necessarily
have. A fiduciary obligation characteristically shapes the fiduciary’s deliber-
ation vis-a`-vis her beneficiary in a particular way. A fiduciary whose deliber-
ation is not shaped in this way does not live up to her fiduciary obligation,
no matter what else she does. Thus the fiduciary duty of loyalty does not
admit of what we call accidental compliance: it is not satisfied by actions done
for inappropriate or illicit reasons.
By contrast, promissory obligations do not have the same intentional
requirements. There is nothing incoherent about inadvertently keeping a
promise. Your promise need not shape your deliberation in any particular
way in order for your action to count as promise-keeping. Therefore, inten-
tions matter to the satisfaction of fiduciary obligations in a way that they do
not matter to promissory obligations. You can accidentally keep a promise,
but you cannot accidentally be loyal.
Our analysis proceeds in three parts. Section II explores the asymmetry
between promissory obligations and the fiduciary obligation of loyalty with
respect to accidental compliance. As normative concepts, loyalty does not
admit of accidental compliance, while promise-keeping does.
This asymmetry indicates that loyalty has a unique intentional dimen-
sion, which we describe in more detail in Section III. There, we provide a
model of the intentional dimension of fiduciary loyalty (which we call the
“shaping” account) and demonstrate its superiority over two alternatives,
the “adopting” and “aiming” accounts.
Section IV utilizes the “shaping” account to critique two prominent strate-
gies that reduce fiduciary obligations to other normative phenomena. The
contractarian approach, which conceives of fiduciary obligations as a species
of contractual obligations, is misguided. Fiduciary obligations cannot be
reduced to promissory obligations because the former have at least one
structural feature that the latter do not have. A second strategy, which we
term the “proscriptivist” approach,2 reduces loyalty to the legal “no con-
flict” and “no profit” rules that constrain fiduciaries. This approach also
fails to capture fiduciary obligations as normative phenomena. One can
successfully (but accidentally) comply with these proscriptive rules, while
accounts with promise-based accounts, which some theorists separate. See, e.g., JONATHAN R.
MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES KEPT, PROMISES BROKEN (2010).
2. See Matthew Conaglen, The Nature and Function of Fiduciary Loyalty, 121 LAW Q. REV. 452,
459–460 (2005); Darryn Jensen, Prescription and Proscription in Fiduciary Obligations, 21 KING’S
L.J. 333 (2010).
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fiduciary loyalty does not admit of accidental compliance. In other words,
some actions that do not violate these rules nevertheless fail to be loyal.
II. ACCIDENTAL COMPLIANCE: AN ASYMMETRY BETWEEN
PROMISSORY AND FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
Subsection A first lays out some preliminaries of our analysis. Subsection B
argues that accidentally complying with a promissory obligation is plausible,
while accidentally complying with a fiduciary obligation is not.
A. Preliminaries
Before offering our argument, we should clarify our terminology and
methodology, then motivate our inquiry. Our main aim is to account for
promises and fiduciary obligations conceptually, as features of our “norma-
tive landscape.”3 Although we offer doctrinal examples in our discussion,
it is entirely possible that the juridical treatment of these phenomena devi-
ates from their more fundamental normative structure. Doctrine sometimes
only hints at the underlying normative terrain. There are rule-of-law values
and pragmatic considerations of institutional design that weigh against the
perfect correspondence between legal doctrine and the underlying norma-
tive phenomenon. To wit, it is routine to think of fiduciary law as exhort-
ing moral behavior4 or involving the underenforcement of moral norms.5
Contract law similarly invokes norms of promise-keeping without necessar-
ily being coextensive with promissory morality. One such example is that
promises can be unilateral and gratuitous, but the law does not enforce
promises without bilateral consideration.6
Ultimately, the prospect of a discrepancy between legal doctrine and the
core features of normative phenomena should not be surprising. However,
there would be plausible reason for concern if the juridical instantiation
of the normative phenomena did violence to the underlying normative
phenomena—for example, if consistently adhering to the norms of contract
made it difficult or impossible for one to be a promise-keeper.7 Our analysis
supposes that there is and should be a connection between the institutional
and noninstitutional versions of certain normative concepts. However, we
do not offer a sustained defense of this assumption nor do we think that
this relationship between normative and juridical phenomena need be one
of identity. While doctrine only hints at an underlying normative terrain,
3. See DAVID OWENS, SHAPING THE NORMATIVE LANDSCAPE (2012).
4. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS 55,
75–76 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1985).
5. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1, at 427, 428 n.6.
6. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §17 (1982).
7. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 HARV. L. REV. 708
(2007).
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there is a normative terrain of obligations that arise out of relationships of
entrustment and vulnerability. Our project is to explore this terrain.
Promises and fiduciary relationships both characteristically generate obli-
gations. Fiduciary obligations arise out of fiduciary relationships, such as the
trustee-beneficiary relationship or the attorney-client relationship. While
there are many aspects to fiduciary obligation, the core duties are generally
seen as loyalty and care. The duty of loyalty is usually thought to require the
fiduciary to pursue the interests of her beneficiary above her own.8 The duty
of care requires acting with reasonable diligence and prudence on behalf of
the beneficiary.9 Most fiduciary scholars identify loyalty as the paradigmatic
fiduciary obligation;10 we adopt this convention and focus our attention on
the criteria for and structure of fiduciary loyalty.11
Many commentators analyze the connection between promissory and
fiduciary obligations in terms of formation, content, or available remedies.
In what follows, however, we mostly ignore these issues. Instead, we focus
on satisfaction, or the conditions under which someone can be said to have
lived up to or discharged the obligations that apply to her. Thus we use
the phrase “A kept her promise to B” instead of the awkward (but more
accurate) “A satisfied her promissory obligations to B regarding ’ing.”
Likewise, we take the phrase “A acted loyally toward B” as equivalent to “A,
in ’ing, satisfied her duty of loyalty toward B.”
Judgments about satisfaction and nonsatisfaction can reveal the contours
of promissory and fiduciary obligations in the same way that evidence about
“reactive attitudes” (like resentment or indignation) are said to reveal the
content of moral principles.12 Moral prohibitions are characteristically as-
sociated with reactive attitudes, which both respond to and criticize the
violation of moral norms. Thus, examining when people react with re-
sentment or indignation to the conduct of others provides some insight
into what kinds of actions are morally prohibited. Similarly, violating an
8. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 5 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539
N.E.2d 574, 576 (N.Y. 1989).
9. See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW (2011), at 169–173.
10. See, e.g., PaulMiller, Justifying Fiduciary Duties, 58MCGILL L.J. 969 (2013); Ernest J. Weinrib,
The Fiduciary Obligation, 25 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (1975).
11. Whether our conclusions about loyalty’s intentional dimension apply to the duty of care
depends on whether “care” is defined in terms of an objective standard (behaving in the
way that a careful person would behave) or a more subjective standard (being careful). To
preview our later argument about loyalty, it seems possible to be careful accidentally if an
objective standard applies, and impossible to be careful accidentally if a subjective standard
applies. We largely sidestep this issue in this article. Some legal contexts (e.g., corporate law)
define carefulness in terms of an objective standard, while others (e.g., the law governing
lawyers) seem to define it in a more subjective way. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §16(1) (requiring a lawyer’s representation to “proceed in a manner
reasonably calculated to advance a client’s lawful objectives, as defined by the client after
consultation”).
12. E.g., R. JAY WALLACE, RESPONSIBILITY AND THE MORAL SENTIMENTS (1994); P.F. Strawson,
Freedom and Resentment, 48 PROC. BRIT. ACAD. 1 (1960); STEPHEN DARWALL, THE SECOND-PERSON
STANDPOINT: MORALITY, RESPECT, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (2006).
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obligation invites a distinctive form of criticism of the violator.13 That a par-
ticular mode of criticizing someone’s actions seems appropriate suggests
that these actions violate her obligations. If such criticism seems inappro-
priate, then it seems plausible to say that she has lived up to her obligation.14
B. Conformity and Compliance; Or, Why Loyalty Is Not
Promise-Keeping
The requirements for satisfying a fiduciary obligation differ from the re-
quirements for satisfying a promissory obligation. In particular, there is an
asymmetry between promise-keeping and loyalty regarding the possibility
of what we call accidental compliance.
To demonstrate what accidental compliancemeans, consider JosephRaz’s
distinction between conformity and compliance. For Raz, a person con-
forms to an obligation if she does what the obligation requires—that is, if
her behavior matches the pattern specified in the obligation. By contrast,
someone complies with an obligation when she acts for it. Compliance,
then, not only requires conforming behavior but also has a further inten-
tional dimension.15 We use the term “accidental compliance” to describe
a subset of actions that conform to but do not comply with an obligation;
namely, ones where an agent’s behavior matches the pattern specified by
the obligation, but the obligation does not have the requisite influence on
her deliberation to count as compliance.
We use the term “accidental” in the sense that some philosophers use the
notion of deviant or “wayward” causation.16 One way to interpret Gettier
13. For example, it licenses a particular grievance by the person to whom the obligation was
directed. See, e.g., Niko Kolodny & R. Jay Wallace, Promises and Practices Revisited, 31 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 119 (2003).
14. Because we address the intentional dimensions of promissory and fiduciary obligations
specifically, one more preface is in order. Our discussion of the relevance of intention to com-
pliance is neutral on the question of whether, in general, intention is central to determining the
permissibility of an action. Our view is also neutral on whether intention generally determines
the moral worth of an action. Rather, our inquiry concerns whether intention is fundamental
to complying with certain kinds of obligations. One might assert that in general, intentions do
not directly determine permissibility or moral value while maintaining that intentions matter
to whether an action constitutes acting loyally or keeping a promise.
15. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS (1999), at 178; Scott Hershovitz, Legitimacy,
Democracy, and Razian Authority, 9 LEGAL THEORY 201 (2003); OWENS, supra note 3, at 15. Our
distinction between these terms is at odds with common legal usage, which sees compliance
and conformity as synonymous.
16. See generally Kieran Setiya, Reasons and Causes, 19 EUR. J. PHIL. 129, 135 (2011). Donald
Davidson provides the following example of wayward causation:
A climber might want to rid himself of the weight and danger of holding another man on
a rope, and he might know that by loosening his hold on the rope he could rid himself
of the weight and danger. This belief and want might so unnerve him as to cause him to
loosen his hold.
DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS (1980), at 73. In Davidson’s example, the
desire to be rid of the other man figures into the explanation of why the climber loosens his
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problems,17 for example, is as ruling out that justified true belief entails
knowledge in cases where the connection between the justification and the
formation of the belief is “accidental,” in particular, where an agent’s arrival
at a correct belief does not proceed through the justification for that belief.
Such cases are often said to exhibit “deviant” causation. “Accidental” for us
has a similarly broad usage. It describes both the unwitting agent who does
not specifically aim to comply with the obligation, as well as cases when an
agent’s conforming behavior reflects bad faith toward either the principal
or the obligation itself. We focus on the case of the unwitting agent, since if
the asymmetry is reflected here, then it is presumably also reflected in the
case of an “illicit” agent.
Promissory obligations seem capable of satisfaction through accidental
compliance. To see how, consider the following example:
Lucky Payer: Abner promises to pay Barry five dollars on Tuesday. On what
Abner believes to be Wednesday, he gives over the contents of his wallet
(which contains a single bill that Abner believes to be a one-dollar bill) to
Barry. Unbeknownst to Abner, it is actually Tuesday, and the bill in Abner’s
wallet is actually a five-dollar bill.
We think Abner has kept his promise even though he didn’t mean to
do so. Accidental compliance with a promissory obligation seems intelli-
gible because promise-keeping is typically about conformity rather than
compliance.18 If you promise to , then you usually keep your promise
if your behavior counts as ’ing. In general, how your behavior comes to
overlap with the content of your promise does not matter to the question
of whether you have kept your promise.
This is not to say definitively that promise-keeping lacks an intentional
dimension. Intentions might be part of the content of a promise. If some-
one promises to look after your best interests in making a decision, then
determining whether she has kept her promise will require some reference
to her intentions as well as her behavior. Rather, our point is that promises
are not always like this. They do not necessarily or routinely have intentional
requirements. Where they do, they do so as part of the content of what is
promised rather than because of a structural feature of promises.
If promises do not necessarily have an intentional component, then
promissory obligations can be satisfied through either conformity or compli-
ance. Consider the Lucky Payer case again. There are many ways to criticize
Abner. We might think him inconsiderate, unreliable, a lout. But we do not
grip, but indirectly rather than in the standard way that reasons figure into the explanation of
our actions.
17. See E. L. Gettier, Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?, 23 ANALYSIS 121 (1963).
18. Here we follow Raz and Hershovitz, who argue that “in general reasons are reasons for
conformity and not compliance.” Hershovitz, supra note 15, at 202 n.4 (citing JOSEPH RAZ, THE
AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979), at 179–182).
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think it is appropriate to say that Abner has violated his core promissory obli-
gation. Abner’s actions seem to be promise-keeping because his behavior
(paying five dollars onTuesday)matches the content of his promise to Barry.
Our argument that accidental compliance satisfies promissory obliga-
tions is largely intuitive, although it has theoretical plausibility.19 However,
some theorists might dispute this argument and contend instead that there
is an irreducibly intentional dimension to promise-keeping. For example,
the defender of an instrumental account of the normativity of promises
(which sees promises as significant insofar as they serve some other basic
interest) might see an intentional dimension to promise-keeping as nec-
essary to facilitate the central values served by promises. Something like
this instrumentalist argument undergirds David Owens’s contention that
nonconscientious conformity with the terms of one’s promise is not really
promise-keeping.20
Consider also a noninstrumentalist account of promises such as T.M.
Scanlon’s, which establishes the normativity of promises in terms of the
“value of assurance.”21 On such an approach, it is unclear whether behavior
that conformed to but did not comply with the terms of a promise would be
compatible with Scanlon’s account of the principle of fidelity (what he calls
“Principle F”), which explains both howpromises can provide assurance and
why they have normative significance.22 Along these lines,Michael Pratt sees
promises as characteristically forming a valuable kind of relationship, and
“[m]erely to do as you said you would do is not to effect a relationship of
any special value with me, except insofar as your doing what you said counts
as the discharge of a duty that you owed to me.”23
19. This plausibility arises out of the epistemic costs of attaching intentional requirements to
obligations. If satisfying an obligation has an intentional dimension, then determining whether
someone has lived up to her obligation is a complicated matter. It is not enough to look at the
pattern of her behavior. Wemust also look to her deliberations or motivations, each of which is
notoriously difficult to discern (perhaps even introspectively). These epistemic costs are not as
daunting in the kinds of intimate settings where loyalty is most commonly invoked, as we argue
below. However, given that promises apply to both intimate and arms-length transactions,
these epistemic costs of monitoring might well be counterproductive. Thus it makes sense
that a structural aspect of promises would not impose costs that only a subset of promisees
would find useful. Moreover, it seems possible to add intentional dimensions to promises, for
example, by including deliberative requirements within the content of the promise or else
undertaking another modality (like a vow or an oath) that more plausibly has an intentional
dimension “off the shelf.”
20. OWENS, supra note 3, at 90–91 (noting that conscientious agency requires respecting a
promise by “giving it the right role in . . . deliberations,” although respecting a promise does not
necessarily involve fulfilling it); id. at 91–92 (“One who takes their promises at all seriously will
sometimes fulfill, sometimes respect, and sometimes acknowledge them. Conscientiousness is
a matter of degree and only someone who neither respects nor acknowledges promises and
fulfils them by accident alone is totally devoid of it.”).
21. See generally T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OTHER (1998), at 302–309.
22. Id. Scanlon’s invocation of fidelity transforms the focus of promise-keeping from mere
behavior into something that resembles loyalty.
23. Michael G. Pratt, Promises, Contract, and Voluntary Obligations, 26 LAW & PHIL. 531, 569–70
(2007). Alternatively, one might argue that the accidental complier discharges her promissory
obligation without living up to it. This seems to be Michael Stocker’s position. See Michael
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In addition to the intuitive and theoretical considerations in favor of
our case, we think it is possible to answer the arguments that posit an
intentional dimension to promise-keeping. However, one might say that
it takes a theory to beat a theory, and we do not have a fully developed
theory of promising to offer here. Thus we are reluctant to assert that
those who deny the intelligibility of accidental promise-keeping (and by
implication attribute an irreducibly intentional dimension to promissory
obligations) are incorrect. Even if there is an intentional dimension to
promise-keeping, though, our main claim about the asymmetry between
promissory and fiduciary obligations can go forward. The asymmetry would
exist (and the reductionist strategies we discuss in Section IV would still
be problematic) if the intentional dimension of promise-keeping differed
from the intentional dimension of loyalty.
In contrast with promissory obligations, the fiduciary’s obligation of loy-
alty is not satisfied by accidental compliance. In other words, it does not
seem possible to act loyally by accident. Consider the following hypothetical
example:
Dartboard Trustee: Tammy Trustee is considering three courses of action on
behalf of Bernice Beneficiary. Through her investigation, Tammy has learned
that Option 1 would best advance Bernice’s interests, while Options 2 and
3 would substantially set back Bernice’s interests. To decide which course of
action to take, Tammy fastens three sheets of paper on a dartboard, marked 1,
2, and 3. Tammy will undertake whichever course of action corresponds with
the sheet on which the dart lands. Tammy’s thrown dart hits the sheet marked
1, which corresponds to Option 1. Because of this, Tammy undertakes Option
1 on Bernice’s behalf.
Stocker, Intentions and Act Evaluations, 67 J. PHIL. 589, 601 (1970) (“One can adequately and
fully and completely discharge an obligation without performing a morally good act, without
acting with or from a good, much less a conscientious, intention.”).
However, Pratt ultimately understands accidental compliance to be a “discharge of a duty,”
and Stocker concedes the possibility of “full[] and complete[] discharge” without intentional
requirements. Even Raz’s conforming/complying distinction hints that conformity substan-
tially satisfies promissory obligations: the promisee has no valid complaint and is owed no
remedy if the promisor has conformed. Promises paradigmatically involve conveying objects,
acting in certain ways, or bringing about states of affairs. If a promisor conveys, acts, or effec-
tuates the relevant state of affairs, then she has kept the promise. Accidental compliance is a
way of discharging one’s obligation. Perhaps it is not the best way, but it is a way that both law
and morality acknowledge.
Vows may work differently, as they seem to carry with them an implied demand of loyalty to a
person or project. Imagine the spouse who sets out one night to engage in adultery with a new
interest but whose date gets called away for an emergency surgery. From one perspective—the
promissory perspective—the spouse did not violate the promise not to cheat (assuming that
monogamy was promised). But the accidental compliance with the vow falls short of the spirit
of fidelity. The marriage vow seems to require more than accidental compliance.
This feature of vows, however, counts in favor of the idea that ordinary promissory obliga-
tions do not have an intentional dimension. A vow can be seen as a way to add an intentional
dimension to a promise, to ensure compliance when conformity is not enough. If promises
had an intentional dimension “off the shelf,” then this feature of vows would be otiose.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 14 Jul 2014 IP address: 150.108.67.165
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Has Tammy Trustee acted loyally toward Bernice Beneficiary? We think
not.However, theDartboardTrustee case parallels theLucky Payer in several
respects. In both scenarios, the protagonist’s pattern of behavior conforms
to the substantive requirements of the obligation. Abner takes the course of
action that a promise-keeper would, and Tammy Trustee takes the course
of action that a loyal trustee would. Yet both cases involve a deviant form of
causation. There is a missing or nonstandard linkage between the protago-
nist’s deliberation and his or her behavior. Yet we reach different verdicts:
Abner keeps his promise, but Tammy Trustee does not act loyally.
There is doctrinal support for the view that loyalty has an intentional
dimension, that a fiduciary does not satisfy her duty of loyalty by accidentally
complying with it. As one court put it, the heart of loyalty is “an attitude,
not a rule.”24 Another court found that a corporate director violated his
fiduciary duty of good faith by “intentionally act[ing] with a purpose other
than that of advancing the best interests of the corporation.”25
These doctrinal tidbits raise a more fundamental issue: namely, that the
notion of loyalty seems to have an intentional dimension “off the shelf.”
Loyalty is in part a term used to describe a set of behaviors. Certain patterns
of behavior can by their very nature be incompatible with acting loyally.26
However, loyalty also has an irreducibly intentional component. As Simon
Keller notes:
The fact that you act towards something in the way that you would if you were
loyal to it does not establish that you really are loyal to it. Whether or not you
are loyal to something depends not only on what you do, but on how you are
motivated.27
One cannot, then, unwittingly act loyally. Unwitting action is action done
for no reason, and the unwitting agent would fail to act for the reasons
(whatever they are) that ground loyalty. “Illicit” loyalty is also incoherent. If
your behavior on behalf of a principal mirrors that of a loyal fiduciary, but
you are motivated by a desire to subvert the interests of the principal, then
you do not act loyally. Otherwise, the double agent who feigns allegiance to
one principal in order to act on behalf of another would act loyally toward
both.
Accordingly, there is an asymmetry between promise-keeping and loyalty.
Acting loyally necessarily has an intentional dimension to it. As such, acci-
24. Chiles v. Robertson, 767 P.2d 903, 911–912 (Or. Ct. App. 1989).
25. In re Disney, 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006). To be sure, there are plenty of cases holding
that good faith and good intentions are not sufficient conditions for loyalty. See Boardman v.
Phipps, [1967] 2 A.C. 46 (H.L.); Regal (Hastings) v. Gulliver, [1967] 2 A.C. 134n (H.L.). But
our argument is that certain kinds of intentions are necessary rather than sufficient for acting
loyally.
26. Thus we do not mean to assert that intentions are all that matter to loyalty. Our claim is
merely that no full account of loyalty can deny its intentional components.
27. SIMON KELLER, THE LIMITS OF LOYALTY (2007), at 3.
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dental compliance is insufficient to satisfy the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.
Keeping a promise, by contrast, does not necessarily have an intentional
dimension. Someone can keep her promise when her behavior conforms to
its terms regardless of her intentional stance. Alternatively, if both promises
and loyalty have intentional dimensions, then the intentional requirements
for acting loyally are different from (and more exacting than) those for
keeping a promise.
III. THE INTENTIONAL DIMENSION OF FIDUCIARY
LOYALTY
In this section, we describe the intentional dimension of fiduciary loyalty.
Subsection A articulates a view that we term the “shaping” account. The
shaping account both explains the asymmetry regarding accidental compli-
ance that we identified in Section II and hones in on the structural differ-
ences between fiduciary and promissory obligations. Subsection B compares
the shaping account to two extant candidates, which we term the “adopting”
and the “aiming” accounts. The shaping account captures the strengths of
these alternatives without inviting the objections against them.
A. The Shaping Account of Loyalty
Just what are the intentional requirements for fiduciary loyalty? We contend
that fiduciary loyalty has a characteristically “shaping” function: in deliberat-
ing, a loyal fiduciary robustly attributes nonderivative significance to her beneficiary’s
interests.28 The exact shaping required for loyalty varies across fiduciary con-
texts. However, if a fiduciary’s deliberation is not shaped in appropriate
ways, then she does not satisfy her obligation of loyalty.
The core of the shaping account is the robust attribution of nonderivative
significance to the beneficiary’s interests. That a particular course of action
would affect the beneficiary’s interests must matter to the fiduciary’s delib-
eration. It is, of course, possible to assign significance to a consideration
without assigning it preemptive significance or incorporating it into one’s
ends. This is the crux of Rawls’s notion of seeing people as “self-originating
28. Our description of the shaping account of loyalty is drawn from T.M. Scanlon’s account of
the shaping function of wrongness. SeeT.M. Scanlon,Wrongness and Reasons: A Re-examination, in
2 OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS 5 (Russ Shafer-Landau ed., 2007). For Scanlon, the judgment
that an action is morally wrong should bear on the deliberation of a moral agent in a particular
way. To judge that an action is wrong is to see it as “not providing eligible reasons for action,”
rather than as “outweighed by some powerful ‘reason to be moral’ that is triggered by the
fact that the action would be wrong.” Id. at 7–8. Scanlon’s formula identifies a deliberative or
agential component to the moral value of action that is short of seeing intentions as directly
determining whether an action is permissible. Ultimately, Scanlon contends, there would be
something defective about an agent’smoral deliberation if it were not shaped by considerations
of wrongness in this way.
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sources of valid claims.”29 One need not take the internal point of view
regarding the claims of another in order to recognize the validity of those
claims. Further, the question of a claim’s validity is distinct from the question
of its weight. The shaping account requires that the beneficiary’s interests
necessarily matter to the fiduciary’s practical deliberation, but it does not
impose any particular weight that these interests must have (beyond having
priority over the fiduciary’s self-interests).
Moreover, the beneficiary’s interests must matter to the fiduciary solely
in virtue of their connection with the beneficiary. The importance of attributing
nonderivative significance can be seen in the following example adapted
from Bernard Williams.30 After a shipwreck, a number of people are drown-
ing, including an agent’s spouse. Various impartial moral schemes might
justify the husband’s saving his wife rather than a stranger. For example,
partiality towards one’s wife in a life-and-death scenario might contribute
to the impartial value of marital relationships. Suppose that the agent saves
his wife because of the impartial justification for spousal favoritism rather
than because she is his wife. Here the husband’s pattern of behavior (i.e.,
rescuing his spouse) conforms to the demands of spousal loyalty because
the husband assigns significance to his wife’s interests. Yet it is difficult to
say that the husband has acted loyally. This difficulty arises because the
husband attributes only derivative significance to his wife’s interests. Her
interests matter only in virtue of the broader utilitarian justification for mar-
ital partiality. The husband would have, in Williams’s memorable phrase,
“one thought too many,” since “it might have been hoped by someone (for
instance, by his wife) that his motivating thought, fully spelled out, would
be the thought that it was his wife, not that it was his wife and that in sit-
uations of this kind it is permissible to save one’s wife.”31 Likewise, on the
shaping account, loyalty requires not only that the beneficiary’s interests
matter, but also that these interests matter because of their connection with
the beneficiary and not in virtue of some other consideration.
Shaping also has a counterfactual element: regardless of what the benefi-
ciary’s interests happen to be, if these interests were different, then the loyal
fiduciary’s deliberative situation would be different as well. In other words,
the beneficiary’s interests shape the fiduciary’s deliberation only if the fidu-
ciary is disposed to revise her deliberation in accordance with changes in
the beneficiary’s interests. This robustness requirement rules out cases of
accidental compliance in which the beneficiary’s interests (formulated in
a particular way) happen to matter to the fiduciary but would not matter
29. See John Rawls, Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory, 77 J. PHIL. 515, 543 (1980) (con-
struing people as “self-originating sources of claims” to mean that “their claims carry weight on
their own without being derived from prior duties or obligations owed to society or to other
persons, or, finally, as derived from, or assigned to, their particular social role”).
30. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, Persons, Character, and Morality, in MORAL LUCK 18 (1982).
31. Id. For Williams, one major shortcoming of utilitarianism is that its theory of value implies
that only considerations of welfare can have nonderivative significance; everything else can
matter only derivatively.
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if formulated in any different way. Loyalty is more robust than this kind of
accidental compliance would allow.
Thus our shaping account posits three elements for fiduciary loyalty.32
A fiduciary acts loyally toward a beneficiary only if (1) the beneficiary’s
interests matter to the fiduciary’s deliberation; (2) these interests matter
solely because they are the interests of the beneficiary rather than for some
other reason; and (3) the fiduciary is disposed to revise her deliberation
based on changes to the beneficiary’s interests.33
The shaping account explains why Tammy Trustee does not act loyally,
even though her pattern of behavior matches that of a loyal trustee. Tammy
violates element (1) because Bernice’s interests do not matter to Tammy’s
deliberation at all. Tammy’s deliberation is structured by the vicissitudes of
a dart throw, which has nothing to do with Bernice’s interests. This account
also explains why the double agent does not act loyally toward her false
principal. Although her behavior otherwise mirrors that of a loyal agent,
the false principal’s interests only matter to the double agent derivatively in
virtue of their capacity to advance the true principal’s interests. This violates
element (2).34
Why must loyalty shape a fiduciary’s deliberation? We think the answer
lies in a variety of aspects of paradigmatic fiduciary relationships. Fiduciary
relationships characteristically involve discretionary powers and high levels
of entrustment. Given imbalances of expertise and power, these relation-
ships also make it difficult for the beneficiary to monitor the fiduciary’s
actions. As a result, the beneficiary in a fiduciary relationship is subject to
the predation of her fiduciary in a way that people generally are not. Each of
32. There are many varieties of loyalty other than fiduciary loyalty, including partisanship,
patriotism, filial loyalty, and professional loyalty. KELLER, supra note 27, at x. We make no claim
about whether the shaping account described here also characterizes loyalty in all of these
guises nor whether (as Keller denies) there are any meaningful unifying features of loyalty.
33. We phrase these elements of the “shaping” account as necessary rather than sufficient
conditions to leave open the possibility that loyalty might have other requirements in both
nonfiduciary and nonlegal contexts. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in
Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 491 (2009) (noting the possibility that loyalty could
involve “being true” to a particular project or relationship type); KELLER, supra note 27, at
16 (positing that motive of loyalty “depends upon or makes essential reference to a special
relationship” in which subject and object stand).
34. The shaping account can also explain why theorists who posit an intentional dimension
to promises (like Owens, Pratt, and Scanlon) can recognize an asymmetry between promise-
keeping and loyalty. For these theorists, keeping a promise might plausibly require attributing
significance to the interests of the promisee, thus ruling out the possibility of accidental
promise-keeping. Yet none of these accounts of promise-keeping could require that this signif-
icance be nonderivative or robust. Consider a scenario where A promises B to. In such a case,
it seems possible for A to keep her promise even though B’s interests figure only derivatively
into A’s reasons for action (e.g., where all that matters to A is the intrinsic importance of’ing
and not the importance of ’ing to B). Also, in ’ing, A might be said to keep her promise to
B even though A lacks a disposition to have made or kept a different promise to γ should B
have needed or requested that promise. Because the asymmetry between promise-keeping and
loyalty is key to our critiques of contractarianism and proscriptivism in Section IV, the shaping
account supports our main points even if one denies our conclusion in Section II about the
intelligibility of accidentally complying with promissory obligations.
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these aspects (discretion, trust, vulnerability, difficulties of monitoring and
accountability) contributes to the explanation of why loyalty has an inten-
tional component. Given a beneficiary’s vulnerability to the fiduciary, the
beneficiary can be expected to be concerned with not only the fiduciary’s
behavior but also her faithfulness. Ensuring that the beneficiary’s interests
shape the fiduciary’s deliberation in a certain way is essential to ensuring
that the beneficiary will not be exploited or have unnecessary risks imposed
upon her.
This functionalist explanation for the connection between shaping and
loyalty makes the shaping account ecumenical. The requisite weight of
the beneficiary’s interests on the fiduciary’s deliberation will vary across
fiduciary contexts in virtue of the beneficiary’s vulnerability or level of en-
trustment. The greater the discretion, trust, or vulnerability, the tighter the
intentional requirements for acting loyally. Thus the shaping account can
explain why obligations of loyalty are calibrated differently across different
kinds of fiduciary relationships, which is often said to be a desideratum of
any viable theory of fiduciary obligations.35
B. Alternatives: Adopting and Aiming
The shaping account is one of many ways to specify the intentional dimen-
sion of fiduciary obligations. Two alternative proposals are the “adopting”
account and the “aiming” account. Both of these alternatives recognize that
fiduciary obligations have an intentional dimension, so both are on the
right track. However, both alternatives are more demanding than the shap-
ing account, and as a result, each faces difficulties that the shaping account
avoids.36
The adopting account articulated by Arthur Laby (among others) posits
that “the irreducible core of the fiduciary relationship is the fiduciary’s obli-
gation to adopt the principal’s goals, objectives, or ends.”37 Laby formulates
the adopting account in Kantian terms. Fiduciary loyalty is open-ended, so
it is a species of what Kant calls “imperfect” duties.38 Disloyalty is a similarly
open-ended inquiry, involving the fiduciary’s “adopting of an end indiffer-
ent to, or in opposition to, the obligatory end”—that is, the ends of the
beneficiary.39 The adopting account can get the intuitively right answers in
both the Dartboard Trustee and double agent cases. In neither case does
35. See Eileen A. Scallen, Promises Broken vs. Promises Betrayed: Metaphor, Analogy, and the New
Fiduciary Principle, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 897, 910 n.48, 911 (1993); D. Gordon Smith, The Critical
Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1483–1484 (2002).
36. We refrain here from discussing even more demanding standards that would require
identification with a beneficiary. If the adopting and aiming accounts fall short, then such an
“identification” account would also.
37. Arthur B. Laby, The Fiduciary Obligation as the Adoption of Ends, 56 BUFF. L. REV. 100, 103
(2008).
38. Id. at 142.
39. Id. at 148.
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 14 Jul 2014 IP address: 150.108.67.165
14 STEPHEN R. GALOOB AND ETHAN J. LEIB
the protagonist satisfy the obligation of loyalty because neither protagonist
adopts her beneficiary’s ends as her own.
We see two main problems with the adopting account, neither of which
seriously wounds the shaping account. The first problem is that the adopting
account cannot easily recognize the limits of fiduciary obligations. Consider
Lord Brougham’s statement that:
[The] advocate, in discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client. To save that client by all means and expedients,
and at all hazards and costs to other persons . . . is his first and only duty;
and in performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the
destruction which he may bring upon others.40
One way to interpret the adopting account is as generalizing Brougham’s
dictum, substituting “fiduciary” for “advocate” and “beneficiary” for “client.”
As Laby sees it, in adopting the ends of the beneficiary, the fiduciary for-
sakes the ends of anyone else (including herself).41 Yet this reading of the
adopting account would have the implausible implication that loyalty could
justify or require the fiduciary’s adoption of the beneficiary’s morally illicit
ends.
To see why, imagine an attorney for Tony Soprano. Tony has a variety of
ends, most of them illicit. Attorneys characteristically have fiduciary obliga-
tions toward their clients, including obligations of loyalty. On the adopting
account, Tony’s attorney could act loyally toward Tony only by adopting
Tony’s illicit ends. We find this implication implausible. Loyalty is often
taken to have normative force: that an action is required as a matter of loy-
alty can change the deontic status of doing it.42 Yet Tony’s attorney would
not have any reason to further Tony’s illicit ends. The generally applicable
prohibitions on this kind of facilitation apply to efforts on Tony’s behalf.43
If fiduciary loyalty could justify fiduciaries in adopting the illicit ends
of their principals, then the fiduciary relationship would implicate a form
of bootstrapping. By forming fiduciary relationships, one could generate
moral permissions or requirements to act in otherwise impermissible ways.44
40. 2 THE TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE (J. Nightingale ed., Albion Press, 1820–1821), at 8.
41. Laby, supra note 37, at 135 (“The fiduciary must appropriate the objectives, goals, or ends
of another and then act on the basis of what the fiduciary believes will accomplish them—a
happy marriage of the principal’s ends and the fiduciary’s expertise.”).
42. See, e.g., GEORGE FLETCHER, LOYALTY: AN ESSAY ON THEMORALITY OF RELATIONSHIPS (1995), at
38–39 (discussing duties generated by various aspects of loyalty); Andrew Oldenquist, Loyalties,
79 J. PHIL. 173 (defending obligations based on loyalties).
43. See Bernard Gert, Loyalty and Morality, in NOMOS LIV: LOYALTY 19 (Sandy Levinson, Joel
Parker & Paul Woodruff eds., 2013) (“Loyalty is morally acceptable only when it does not
involve violating a moral rule.”).
44. See ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES (1999), at 3. On bootstrapping of
reasons generally, see John Broome, Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We Cope with In-
commensurable Values?, in PRACTICAL RATIONALITY AND PREFERENCE: ESSAYS FOR DAVID GAUTHIER
98–120 (Christopher Morris & Arthur Ripstein eds., 2001); MICHAEL E. BRATMAN, INTENTIONS,
PLANS AND PRACTICAL REASONS (1999).
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Bootstrapping is problematic on a variety of theoretical grounds, not least
of which is that it denies the overridingness of moral verdicts.45 Loyalty is
a form of partiality, a way of treating someone’s interests differently from
the (potentially conflicting) interests of others. To the extent that partiality
can be justified, this justification has limits. Generally applicable principles
of partiality seem capable of requiring or forbidding actions that are other-
wise optional but not of permitting or requiring actions that are otherwise
morally prohibited.46 Thus, if loyalty is taken to have normative significance,
then the adopting account (at least as Laby formulates it) cannot easily rec-
ognize the limits of loyalty. This account cannot explain why loyalty does
not provide a justification for Tony Soprano’s attorney to adopt her client’s
illicit ends.
The shaping function avoids these difficulties. One can attribute signif-
icance to a beneficiary’s interests (in accordance with element (1) of the
shaping account) without adopting those interests as one’s own. Of course,
adopting the ends of a beneficiary is sometimes an effective way of ensuring
that a fiduciary makes the kinds of attributions constitutive of loyalty. It
is sometimes easier to see how to advance the ends of another when you
take those ends to be your own. But taking this stance is not a necessary
condition for acting loyally.47 Moreover, one can attribute nonderivative
significance to a consideration without seeing it as preeminent. On the
shaping account, then, Tony Soprano’s lawyer can act loyally and within the
bounds of partiality by taking Tony’s licit ends to have significance in virtue
of their being his ends; taking Tony’s illicit ends to be normatively inert in
virtue of being illicit, based on general constraints concerning partiality;
and being disposed to advance Tony’s ends if they were to become licit. The
legal limits on what loyalty can permit or require thus cohere with loyalty’s
deeper normative structure.
A second (and more fundamental) problem with the adopting account
is that it admits of accidental compliance. Laby’s version of the adopting
account is concerned primarily with the requirement that the fiduciary
adopt the beneficiary’s ends. Laby does not discuss the process by which
this adoption must occur.48 Yet this leaves the adopting account susceptible
to fulfillment through deviant causation—that is, to cases where a fiduciary
adopts a beneficiary’s ends in a way that does not seem to exhibit loyalty to-
ward the beneficiary. Say that a fiduciary and beneficiary are both members
45. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Moral Overridingness and Moral Subjectivism, 109 ETHICS 772
(1999).
46. See, e.g., Niko Kolodny,Which Relationships Justify Partiality? The Case of Parents and Children,
38 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 37 (2010); Brenda Almond, Reasonable Partiality in Professional Relationships,
8 ETHICAL THEORY & MORAL PRAC. 155, 166 (2005).
47. See Philip Pettit, The Paradox of Loyalty, 25 AM. PHIL. Q. 163, 168 (1988) (“Loyalty can
hardly require the agent to prize the individual essence of the principal; on the contrary, it
is compatible with severe reservations about his particular worth. What it demands is rather
susceptibility to the fact that the principal is, relatively speaking, one of his own.”).
48. SeeLaby, supranote 37, at 130 (“The fiduciary’s adoption of the principal’s ends, regardless
of the overall consequences of doing so, is the unifying theme in fiduciary cases.”).
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of a highly demanding religion. By virtue of their common membership in
this religious group, the fiduciary might adopt the beneficiary’s ends. How-
ever, the beneficiary would not figure necessarily in this adoption story:
that these ends were the ends of the beneficiary would not explain why
the fiduciary adopts them. This scenario does not indicate loyalty to the
beneficiary so much as loyalty to a group of which the beneficiary happens
to be a member. Yet Laby’s version of the adopting account cannot cap-
ture this result. On his view, the fiduciary who adopts the beneficiary’s ends
based on considerations unrelated to the beneficiary acts just as loyally as
the fiduciary who adopts these ends because they are the beneficiary’s.
The shaping view avoids the prospect of accidentally complying with obli-
gations of loyalty. If the interests of the beneficiary matter to the fiduciary
solely in virtue of their membership in a common religion, then the fidu-
ciary attributes only derivative significance to the interests of the beneficiary.
This would violate element (2) of the shaping standard. Moreover, the ben-
eficiary’s interests might (ex hypothesi) cease to matter to the fiduciary if
they deviated from the ends set by the common religion. This would violate
element (3) of the shaping standard.
Another way of specifying loyalty’s intentional dimension is what might
be called, after Lionel Smith, the “aiming” account.49 On this view, fiduciary
loyalty requires aiming to act in beneficiary’s best interest. Loyalty is thus
largely a question of motivation: “Whatever powers a fiduciary has, he must
exercise (or not exercise them) with a particular motive. He must act (or
not act) in what he perceives to be the best interests of the beneficiary.”50
For Smith, this intentional requirement differentiates the fiduciary duty of
loyalty from the duties of care anddiligence: the latter dependonwhether “a
particular objective standard was not met. Motive is irrelevant.” By contrast,
“the exercise of a power can be set aside for a breach of the duty of loyalty
if the power was exercised (and presumably if a decision was made not to
exercise a power) with the wrong motive.”51
On the aiming account, then, loyalty is determined by whether consider-
ation of the beneficiary’s interests figured causally into the agent’s behavior.
If a concern for advancing these interests caused the fiduciary to act, then
the fiduciary has acted loyally. Where this concern does not play this causal
role, the fiduciary has not acted loyally. As Smith puts it, fiduciary loyalty is
about the “justiciability of motive.”52 Chancellor Leo Strine and co-authors
contend that Delaware corporate law embodies something like the aiming
account:
49. See Lionel Smith, The Motive, Not the Deed, in RATIONALIZING PROPERTY, EQUITY AND TRUSTS:
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF EDWARD BURN 53 (Joshua Getzler ed., 2003).
50. Id. at 67.
51. Id. at 70–71.
52. Id. at 64.
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The termgood faith has long beenused as the key element in defining the state
of mind that must motivate a loyal fiduciary. To wit, the duty of loyalty most
fundamentally requires that a corporate fiduciary’s actions be undertaken in
the good faith belief that they are in the best interests of the corporation and
its stockholders.53
Aside from its power to explain amajor source of fiduciary jurisprudence,
the aiming account has important strengths. Like the adopting account,
the aiming account can explain why neither the Dartboard Trustee nor the
double agent acts loyally. Neither protagonist is moved to act by the interests
of the beneficiary. Further, unlike the adopting account, the aiming account
does not admit of accidental compliance. To wit, the coreligionist fiduciary
does not act loyally toward her beneficiary because she does not act in order
to advance the beneficiary’s interests so much as to advance interests that
the beneficiary happens to have.
Despite these strengths, however, we think the aiming account fails to
capture the intentional dimension of fiduciary loyalty for at least two rea-
sons. First, the aiming account raises concerns about fairness. It is generally
thought to be unfair to hold someone responsible for something she can-
not control or help.54 If “ought” implies “can,” then the aiming account
relies on the voluntarist assumption that people can control the reasons
for which they act. It would not be fair to hold a fiduciary to account for
an action done for an illicit reason while holding him harmless for doing
that same action for a licit reason (as the aiming account does) unless the
fiduciary were capable of acting for one of these reasons but not the other.
Furthermore, the aiming account assumes self-knowledge, or that people
have privileged access to their own motivational states and know why they
do what they do.
Yet both these voluntarist and self-knowledge assumptions are (at best)
controversial. Smith acknowledges that the motives of others “are in-
scrutable at the best of times”; this inscrutability, he claims, grounds the
no-profit and no-conflict legal rules that govern fiduciaries.55 Some philoso-
phers (influenced by developments in neuroscience and psychology) sug-
gest that our ownmotives are similarly inscrutable to introspective analysis.56
53. Leo E. Strine, et al., Loyalty’s Core Demand: The Defining Role of Good Faith in Corporate Law,
98 GEO. L.J. 629, 633 (2010). Strine et al. make this point in service of a larger argument
that the Delaware corporate law fiduciary duty of loyalty presupposes that the fiduciary act in
“good faith,” which in turn requires that the fiduciary be “motivat[ed] to serve the legitimate
interests of those to whom fiduciary duties are owed.” Id. at 663–664.
54. See Ethan J. Leib, Responsibility and Social/Political Choices about Choice, 25 LAW & PHIL. 453
(2006).
55. Smith, supra note 49 at 74.
56. See, e.g., Eric Schwitzgebel, The Unreliability of Naı¨ve Introspection, 117 PHIL. REV. 245, 247
(2008) (“Contemporary philosophers and psychologists often doubt the layperson’s talent
in assessing such nonconscious mental states as personality traits, motivations and skills,
hidden beliefs and desires, and the bases of decisions; and they may construe such doubts
as doubts about introspection.”). Many of the findings questioning the reality of privileged
http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 14 Jul 2014 IP address: 150.108.67.165
18 STEPHEN R. GALOOB AND ETHAN J. LEIB
Furthermore, there is good reason to deny that people have the power to
intend at will.57 We do not mean to resolve whether either the voluntarist
or self-knowledge assumption is true. However, if either assumption is false,
then the aiming account is unfair, assuming that “ought” implies “can.”
By contrast, the shaping account does not require that fiduciaries have
privileged access to their mental states or voluntary control over the reasons
for which they act. Rather, it requires only that the beneficiary’s interests
structure the fiduciary’s deliberation in the specific way described above:
namely, that the beneficiary’s interests have nonderivative significance and
that the fiduciary be disposed to update her deliberative orientation given
changes in the beneficiary’s interests.Without fully elaborating an argument
(which would require, among other things, a complete account of practical
deliberation), it seems much more likely that these requirements do not
ask too much. It is more plausible that you know how, why, and how much
something matters to you than that you know why you act.58 It is also more
plausible that you can control the significance of a consideration in your
deliberation (say, by adjusting your reasoning in order tomake the requisite
attributions) than that you can control your motivations for acting.59
A second problem is that the aiming account deems loyalty impossible
in cases where we have good reason to think it is possible and, indeed, to
be expected. In particular, the aiming account denies that a fiduciary who
is alienated from the beneficiary’s interests could act loyally toward that
beneficiary. Yet, to the extent that some form of alienation appears in many
fiduciary relationships (and is perhaps inevitable in themodern world), this
conclusion would be highly revisionist.
Consider the case of a disaffected attorney who knowingly undertakes the
best course of action for her client as part of going through themotions. We
think it is possible for such a disaffected attorney to live up to her fiduciary
introspective access arise in social psychology and moral psychology. Whether introspection
provides privileged access to one’s motivations is a highly contested question. However, even
those who believe in the possibility of robust self-knowledge can accept that agents are of-
ten prone to self-deception about why they act. Irit Samet draws on (mostly philosophical)
research about self-deception to make a similar point that structural features of the fiduciary
relationship render fiduciaries especially prone to self-deception (and as a result, self-dealing)
in conflict-of-interest scenarios. See Irit Samet, Guarding the Fiduciary’s Conscience—A Justification
of a Stringent Profit-Stripping Rule, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 763, 781 (2008),
57. See Gregory S. Kavka, The Toxin Puzzle, 43 ANALYSIS 33 (1983); Pamela Hieronymi, Control-
ling Attitudes, 87 PAC. PHIL. Q. 45, 63 (2006). Indeed, the psychological difficulty of controlling
the reasons for which one acts (coupled with a commitment to the slogan that “ought implies
can”) lead some to reject the notion that motive matters for rightness at all. See, e.g., W. DAVID
ROSS, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (2002), at 4–5.
58. As David Owens puts it, the “capacity to determine which reasons have weight in [one’s]
practical deliberation and which do not” is a requirement of practical agency, of being “fully
in control of [one’s] practical reasoning.” OWENS, supra note 3, at 88–89.
59. Still, we acknowledge that the shaping standard might present some legitimate concerns
about fairness, because whether an agent is counterfactually disposed to deliberate in a certain
way might not be fully within her control.
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obligations, to act loyally toward her client.60 Yet the aiming account could
not reach this verdict; because the disaffected attorney is “just doing her
job” rather than being moved by the goal of advancing her client’s interests,
she cannot act loyally toward her client.
By contrast, on the shaping account, the intentional dimension of loyalty
imposes deliberative requirements rather thanmotivational ones.61 Motives
are one way of specifying loyalty’s intentional dimension, but not the only
(or even the best) way to do so. Many phenomena that have intentional
components do not impose specific or strict motivational requirements.
Take the example of instrumental rationality. Acting rationally has inten-
tional components (e.g., the requirement to structure deliberation and
respond to evidentiary considerations in certain ways) but no explicit mo-
tivational requirement. Why you act rationally is not necessarily connected
with whether you act rationally.62
Similarly, on the shaping account, whether you act loyally is not solely (or
necessarily) a function of why you act. We agree with Smith’s more recent ar-
gument that the intentional component of loyalty is not solely a function of
motive.63 A wide variety ofmotivations seem compatible with acting loyally.64
Both the alienated attorney and the true believer can act loyally, since both
are capable of making the requisite attributions and having the appropri-
ate dispositions regarding their clients’ interests. However, we disagree with
Smith’s further conclusion that motive is irrelevant to determining whether
one has satisfied her duty of loyalty. Rather, certainmotives can preclude the
possibility of loyal action by negating intentional requirements of loyalty.65
The double agent comes to mind: her motives for furthering the false
60. Indeed, we can envision a variety of situations where such self-conscious detachment from
a role (or, as Meir Dan-Cohen describes it, “role distance”) could have salutary effects. SeeMEIR
DAN-COHEN, HARMFUL THOUGHTS (2002), at 235.
61. In recent work Smith rejects the aiming account. See Lionel Smith, Can We Be Obliged
to Be Selfless?, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew Gold & Paul
Miller eds., forthcoming 2014). In the terms we use here, Smith acknowledges that there is an
intentional dimension to fiduciary loyalty but denies that this dimension is defined solely (or at
all) by the motives of the agent. Smith rejects the aiming account largely for its incompatibility
with Kantian notions of duties. For Smith, fiduciary loyalty is a duty of right, and (on Kant’s
framework) motives are irrelevant to determining whether one has lived up to a duty of right.
Although we agree with Smith’s rejection of the aiming account, we think that Smith goes too
far in completely denying the relevance of motives. As we discuss below, some motivations can
bear on whether one has acted loyally, although in many cases a wide variety of motivations
are compatible with acting loyally. Moreover, we disagree with Smith’s reasons for rejecting
the aiming account—namely, the goal of compatibility with Kantian notions of duties. The
shaping account that we defend here is inconsistent with the Kantian framework because it
sees loyalty as a duty of right (in that loyalty is both directed and legally enforceable) yet allows
for the possibility that someone’s motives could bear directly on whether she acts loyally.
62. See Niko Kolodny, Why Be Rational?, 114 MIND 509 (2005).
63. Smith, Can We Be Obliged to Be Selfless?, supra note 61.
64. See KELLER, supra note 27, at 21 (“There are many different ways of being loyal; a par-
ticular loyalty may involve any of several kinds of motive, so long as they have a certain basic
structure.”).
65. See, e.g., Gert, supra note 43, at 7 (“Motives for loyalty must not depend upon beliefs about
the consequences for oneself of showing loyalty.”).
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principal’s interests rule out the possibility that she could attribute the kind
of nonderivative significance to the interests of the false principal that would
be required of loyal action.
In sum, we agree with Laby’s and Smith’s (erstwhile) positions that fidu-
ciary loyalty has an intentional dimension. However, neither the adopting
nor the aiming standard best describes this dimension. The shaping ac-
count is superior because it can resolve cases that undermine these other
standards. Fiduciary loyalty requires robustly attributing nonderivative sig-
nificance to a beneficiary’s interests in virtue of the beneficiary’s having
them. If the fiduciary fails to attribute this significance to the beneficiary’s
interests and ends, then no matter what else we can say about her actions,
she does not act loyally.
IV. AGAINST REDUCING FIDUCIARY OBLIGATIONS
Our analysis of the intentional dimension of fiduciary obligation, if sound,
has important implications for ongoing theoretical debates. Both “contrac-
tarianism” and a view that we call “proscriptivism” are attempts to reduce
fiduciary obligations to some other normative phenomenon. Debates about
contractarianism, discussed below in Subsection A, concern whether fidu-
ciary obligations can be reduced to contractual obligations. Debates about
proscriptivism, discussed below in Subsection B, concern whether fiduciary
obligations can be reduced to the legal rules that prohibit fiduciaries from
conflicts of interests and profiting from beneficiaries. Neither of these re-
ductionist strategies captures the intentional dimension of fiduciary obli-
gations, the way that loyalty must shape the deliberation of the fiduciary.
Therefore, neither of these positions describes the normative structure of
fiduciary obligations.
A. Against Contractarianism
The so-called contractarian position sees fiduciary obligations as a species
of contractual obligations. The contractarian asserts that it is possible to
redescribe fully the former in terms of the latter. Contractarianism is in part
an argument about how fiduciary obligations arise—namely, from voluntary
arrangements, just as contractual obligations do.66 As Larry Ribstein puts it,
“one becomes a fiduciary only by contract, including by contracting for a
relationship in which the law says fiduciary duties arise.”67 The contractarian
also contends that fiduciary and contractual obligations have a common
structure and content: the content is fixed by agreement, with doctrinal
66. See Langbein, supra note 1, at 650; Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1; James Edelman,
When Do Fiduciary Duties Arise?, 126 LAW Q. REV. 302 (2010).
67. Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV. 899, 902 (2011).
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provisions serving as default rules.68 As such, fiduciary obligations (like
contractual obligations) can be modified and disclaimed by the agreements
of the parties.69 These commonalities in origin and structure indicate a
common instrumental goal: the point of both fiduciary and contractual
obligations is to maximize the utility of the parties to these obligations.
Because the contractarian position has its roots in the law-and-economics
tradition, many contractarians utilize (sometimes unwittingly) an addi-
tional premise that contractual performance is solely about behavior. The
promises underlying contracts concern behaviors (“pay or perform”), and
you satisfy your contractual obligation by behaving in the way specified by
your contractual obligation or by paying expectation damages.70 By impli-
cation, the contractarian is committed to the position that fiduciary obli-
gations are also about behavior: you satisfy your fiduciary obligation by
behaving in the way that loyalty specifies, or else by paying damages.
Several commentators have argued against the contractarian position,
denying that contractual and fiduciary obligations share a common origin71
or a common structure.72 However, the contractarian can evade many of
these criticisms by recasting fiduciary obligations as based on a hypothetical
bargain, reflecting the terms that the fiduciary and beneficiary would have
agreed upon if they had considered them. Thus the contractarian can ex-
plain any putatively distinct elements of fiduciary obligations as a species of
promissory obligations.
The contractarian position has many strengths. It can explain some core
features of fiduciary law, as well as its variation across contexts. However,
our analysis points to a deep problem with the contractarian view, one that
cannot be evaded by the legerdemain of appeal to hypothetical bargain.
In general, it is possible to reduce A to B only if every element of A is
also an element of B. Thus the contractarian’s reduction is possible only
if every element of fiduciary obligation is also an element of contractual
obligation. Yet, as the arguments of Sections II and III indicate, these two
phenomena have different intentionality requirements. Promissory obliga-
tions can be satisfied through accidental compliance; given the intentional
dimension to fiduciary loyalty, fiduciary obligations cannot. Thus the con-
68. To the extent that some aspects of contractual and fiduciary obligations are notmodifiable
(e.g., unconscionability and good faith in contract, and good faith in fiduciary law), the
contractarian can argue that these parallel each other. As we explain below, however, these
good-faith obligations likely differ in their content, so the superficial parallel here is more
complicated than it looks.
69. See generally Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting out of Fiduciary Duties: A Response
to the Anti-Contractarians, 65 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1990).
70. See Alan Schwartz & Joel Watson, Conceptualizing Contract Interpretation, 42 J. LEGAL STUD.
1 (2013); Steve Thel & Peter Siegelman, Willfullness versus Expectation: A Promisor-Based Defense
of Willful Breach Doctrine, 107 MICH. L. REV. 1517 (2009).
71. See, e.g., Tamar Frankel, How to Water Down Fiduciary Duties, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUN-
DATIONS OF FIDUCIARY LAW (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., forthcoming 2014).
72. See Scott FitzGibbon, Fiduciary Relationships Are Not Contracts, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 303 (1999);
Daniel Markovits, Sharing Ex Ante and Ex Post, in THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF FIDUCIARY
LAW (Andrew Gold & Paul Miller eds., forthcoming 2014).
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tractarian position is conceptuallymistaken. Acting loyally has requirements
that promise-keeping does not.73
The contractarian might respond to our critique by denying that there is
any asymmetry between contractual and fiduciary obligations. For example,
the contractarian might relax the behaviorist assumption described above
and posit that fiduciary loyalty involves both a promise to behave in a par-
ticular manner and a promise to regard the interests of the beneficiary in
certain ways. Alternatively, the contractarian might contend that promis-
sory obligations (like fiduciary obligations) have an intentional dimension
that is captured in the requirement of “good-faith performance.”74 If either
of these efforts to deny the asymmetry succeeds, then the contractarian
could still redescribe fiduciary obligations as promises or concatenations of
promises.
Before examining these rehabilitative efforts, it is important to note how
much they would concede. Broadening the notion of promise-keeping to
includemore thanmere behavior (“pay or perform”) would, as noted above,
undermine a fundamental tenet of the law-and-economics tradition out of
which the contractarian position arises. Arguably, the analytic tractability
of the behaviorist assumption is what inspired the effort to reduce diverse
legal phenomena to contract. Thus, giving up behavior-based criteria for
promise-keeping is no small concession. Likewise, many law-and-economics
scholars deny that good-faith requirements are either useful or coherent
tools for analyzing contractual obligations. Thus the contention that these
standards form part of the core of two different (and prominent) types of
obligations would not sit well with many contractarians.
In any event, it is not clear that either of these attempts to rehabili-
tate contractarianism by denying the asymmetry succeed. Seeing fiduciary
obligations as constellations of promises to behave and to consider inter-
ests would not change the fact that all of the component promises can be
satisfied through accidental compliance. Consider the following scenario
involving a promise to consider someone’s interests:
Big Decision Hypnosis: Annie promises Betty to consider Betty’s interests in
making a big decision that will affect Betty (among others). Prior to making
the decision, Annie is hypnotized such that, in making the big decision, she
will consider the interests of the next person she sees after awaking from the
hypnotic state. After awaking from the hypnotic state, the first person Annie
sees is Betty. Thus Annie considers Betty’s interest in making the big decision.
73. One intriguing implication of our analysis is that the intentional aspects of loyalty may not
be disclaimable in whole or in part. In some legal environments, the duty of loyalty itself can
be disclaimed altogether. Our analysis might imply that this legal doctrine is fundamentally
mistaken. However, even if it were possible to disclaim the duty of loyalty itself, it might not be
possible (or coherent) to establish by agreement that accidental compliance satisfies the duty
of loyalty. We leave the exploration of this topic for future work.
74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §205; U.C.C. §1–304.
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We think that Annie keeps her promise to consider Betty’s interests. If
so, then promises to consider someone’s interests can be satisfied through
accidental compliance. What matters is that interests are considered, not
how this consideration comes about. However, given the contingency of
Annie’s consideration of Betty’s interests, it seems that Annie has not acted
loyally toward Betty.
The shaping account can explain why Annie has failed to act loyally.
While Annie attributes some significance to Betty’s interests, this attribu-
tion is derivative (in virtue of seeing Betty after being hypnotized) rather
than nonderivative (in virtue of the interests being Betty’s). Thus it violates
element (2) of the shaping account. Moreover, the attribution is not robust.
Although Annie happens to consider Betty’s interest in this scenario, she
might not have done so if she had come across someone other than Betty
after awaking from hypnosis. Thus her actions also violate element (3) of
the shaping account. In sum, the asymmetry regarding accidental compli-
ance remains, and the redescription of fiduciary obligations in terms of
contractual obligations fails.75
Likewise, appealing to a good-faith requirement for the satisfaction of
contractual obligations would not save the contractarian position. For the
contractarian’s reductionist strategy to succeed, it is not enough that both
promissory and fiduciary obligations have some intentional requirements.
Rather, they must have the same intentional requirements—the conditions
for keeping a promise must be identical to those for acting loyally. One
prominent view construes contractual good faith in terms of opportunis-
tic behavior.76 Under this standard, there is nothing necessarily defective
about accidental compliance. For example, the Lucky Payer is an example
of accidental compliance without opportunism at all. Even on a broader
construction of good faith, examples of accidental compliance would not
necessarily constitute promise-breaking.77
This argument can be framed in more positive terms. The broadest con-
struction of contractual good faith (which, incidentally, most contractarians
would reject for its breadth) requires the promisor to attribute significance
75. The contractarian might try to redescribe the obligation of loyalty in terms of a promise
to act loyally. However, this move would involve assigning intentional requirements as part of
the content of a promise and thus would concede that there are structural differences between
promissory obligations and the duty of loyalty.
76. See Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good Faith, 94
HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980).
77. E.g., Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith: Its Recognition and Conceptualization
in the New Restatement of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982); Robert S. Summers, Good
Faith in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV.
195 (1968). Summers essentially defines bad faith as that which is not in good faith. However,
even here, accidental compliance is not necessarily bad-faith compliance. The Lucky Payer
case does not involve abuse of power, interference with a promisee, failure to cooperate with a
promisee, or the intentional rendering of imperfect performance. Maybe Lucky Payer involves
an evasion of “the spirit of bargain,” but this contention would beg the question as to whether
loyalty can be the subject matter of a bargain in the first place (which the shaping account
denies).
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to the interests of the promisee. This requirement parallels element (1) of
the shaping account of fiduciary loyalty. However, contractual good faith
imposes no counterpart to element (2) of the shaping account, which re-
quires that the interests of the beneficiary have nonderivative significance
to the fiduciary. Nor is there any counterpart to element (3), which requires
that the beneficiary’s interests matter robustly to the fiduciary. Indeed, such
a requirement would seem absurd in the context of promises, tantamount
to the notion that where A promises B to, A keeps this promise to only if
she would have been similarly disposed to γ had B asked (or bargained) for
it. Even if good faith imposes an intentional dimension to promise-keeping,
the requirements of acting loyally are far more exacting than the require-
ments of performing in good faith, so the contractarian’s reduction does
not succeed. The “good faith” required of contractual performance (which
is usually considered in objective terms) is not coextensive with the inten-
tional dimension of fiduciary loyalty, which has an undeniably subjective
component.78
B. Against Proscriptivism
Our analysis in Sections II and III also casts doubt on efforts to redescribe
fiduciary obligations in terms of the proscriptions applicable to fiduciaries,
a strategy we call proscriptivism. Some advocate for proscriptivism directly.79
Others embrace it indirectly by distinguishing between “minimal” and “max-
imal” notions of loyalty and arguing that both are legally cognizable.80
Matthew Conaglen offers the most developed version of the proscriptivist
position.81 Conaglen seeks to identify what is distinctive about fiduciary
obligations under British Commonwealth law. He argues that the “no con-
flict” rule (which prohibits fiduciaries from “acting with a conflict between
duty and interest”) and the “no profit” rule (which prohibits fiduciaries
from “making a profit off of the fiduciary position”) both “form the core of
the fiduciary doctrine and . . . constitute its conceptualization of loyalty.”82
Conaglen contends that the conjunction of these rules facilitates the fidu-
ciary’s discharge of his nonfiduciary duties toward the beneficiary (which
may be promissory in nature). Every other aspect of fiduciary obligations
(like the duty of care and the duty not to act for improper purposes) has
a parallel in nonfiduciary obligations. So, Conaglen argues, the fiduciary’s
78. See generally Strine et al., supra note 53.
79. See Conaglen, supra note 2; Jensen, supra note 2; Peter Birks, The Content of Fiduciary Obli-
gation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3 (2000); Ribstein, supra note 67, at 908. The contractarian position need
not overlap with the proscriptivist position—but it sometimes does, especially if contractarian
invokes an institutional notion of fiduciary obligation rather than a colloquial or conceptual
notion.
80. See Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate Law, 28 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 27, 37 (2003) (citing FLETCHER, supra note 42, at 9).
81. See Conaglen, supra note 2.
82. Id. at 459–460.
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duty of loyalty can be completely redescribed as the conjunction of the “no
conflict” and “no profit” rules.
Conaglen’s analysis is incomplete as a description of positive law and
conceptually confused as a description of loyalty as a normative concept
(although, to be sure, Conaglen does not aspire to the latter task). First, the
“no conflict” and “no profit” rules are not the only ways to conceptualize
fiduciary loyalty. For example, the shaping account of loyalty offers an alter-
native way of appreciating what is distinctive about fiduciary obligations. On
this view, fiduciary obligations differ from other types of obligations based
on the specific intentional requirements that they impose on fiduciaries.
Second, Conaglen’s proscriptive account is problematic because it ne-
glects the intentional dimension of fiduciary loyalty. In life (if not in law), it
seems possible for a fiduciary to satisfy both the “no conflict” and “no profit”
rules while failing to act loyally. For example, in circumstances of accidental
compliance, a fiduciary could meet the “no conflict” and “no profit” rules
without acting loyally.
Consider the Dartboard Trustee case once again. Tammy Trustee has no
conflicts of interest in her representation of Bernice Beneficiary. Nor does
Tammy reap unwarranted profit at Bernice’s expense. Therefore, Tammy
does not run afoul of either the “no conflict” or “no profit” rules. Conaglen’s
view, then, implies that Tammy acts loyally, although he might contend that
Tammy’s actions run afoul of one or more of her nonfiduciary duties. But
Tammy does not seem to act loyally. Her actions violate elements (2) and (3)
of the shaping account. Because proscriptivism cannot capture the inten-
tional dimension of loyalty, it cannot account for the structure of fiduciary
obligations. To cite a real-world example, in a traditional hedge fund op-
eration the asset managers’ fee of “two and twenty” (two percent as a set
management fee plus 20 percent of the profits of the fund)might be earned
without conflict or extra profit, with managers and investors all receiving
a substantial return on investment. Yet if the managers’ “proprietary soft-
ware” that makes the trading decisions in the fund were to invest based on
a random algorithm, then the managers would seem to run afoul of their
requirement of loyalty. In this scenario, the “two and twenty” fee would seem
to be susceptible to disgorgement, the standard remedy for a breach of the
legal duty of loyalty.
The proscriptivist might try to evade our critique by casting her position
solely in descriptive terms, eschewing any attempt to describe loyalty as
a normative phenomenon. (The contractarian might try a similar move.)
On this gambit, proscriptivism (and contractarianism) attempts only to
describe how judges decide cases involving alleged breaches of fiduciary
duties. We think that this strategy is mistaken. For example, epistemic diffi-
culties in determining subjective mental states might prompt legal institu-
tions to utilize specialized tests for measuring whether a fiduciary’s actions
were in good faith. However, this utilization would not actually establish
whether good faith (as a normative phenomenon) is ultimately subjective or
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objective. What loyalty is and whether someone has acted loyally seem to
have answers that are independent of judicial determinations.83 The uti-
lization of objective standards might make the inquiry manageable, but this
concern about administrability does not mean that the result of the inquiry
is the unvarnished truth about the underlying normative phenomenon. In-
deed, administrability concerns might preclude an inquiry from tracking
the normative truth. Thus, if proscriptivists and contractarians recast their
projects as simply describing how judges deploy a purely juridical concept,
then theymust relinquish any ambition to explain the underlying normative
phenomena. We think that a project that aims to describe legal concepts
while eschewing the broader normative landscape is problematic, even on
its own terms.84
V. CONCLUSION
Loyalty makes demands on us. Some of these demands concern our ac-
tions, and others concern our deliberation. Fiduciary loyalty’s deliberative
demands are best captured by the “shaping” account. When you act loyally
toward someone, she should matter to your deliberation in specific ways. If
someone does not matter to your deliberation in these ways, then you do
not act loyally toward her.
Promises also impose demands, but not the same kinds of demands as
loyalty. The demands of promises concern behaviors. They do not center on
intentions. How you deliberate about a promise (or a promisee) is usually
irrelevant to whether your actions count as promise-keeping. Thus promises
and loyalty are not the same thing, and the latter cannot be accounted for
solely in terms of the former. Those (like the contractarian or the proscrip-
tivist) who attempt to reduce fiduciary loyalty to something else miss the
essence of what loyalty is and why it matters.
Our account of the structure of fiduciary obligations has other important
implications that we cannot explore at lengthhere. For example, anongoing
debate in fiduciary theory concerns the extension of fiduciary concepts to
various areas in public law, where public offices are often considered to
83. Some judges appreciate this fact, see Strine et al., supra note 53, which perhaps explains
(in part) whymoral rhetoric is so common in fiduciary law. Easterbrook and Fischel dismiss the
rhetoric rather than engage the more abstract question of how accurately legal rules should
attempt to capture the normative landscape. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 1.
84. In response, the proscriptivist or contractarian might simply deny that analyzing loyalty’s
conceptual structure is relevant to legal debates about fiduciary obligations. On this argument,
the legal use of terms like “loyalty” and “promise” would have no essential connection to the
nonlegal use of these terms. Rather, it could be argued that fiduciary loyalty is an isomorphism
of loyalty in general, and an imperfect reproduction at that. The contractarian or proscriptivist
would still owe an argument for why it is a good idea for the legal version of a concept like
“promise” or “loyalty” to diverge significantly from the noninstitutional version of that concept.
Moreover, this isolation itself seems descriptively inaccurate, since courts routinely appeal to
the noninstitutional features of promises and loyalty in deciding cases in contract and fiduciary
law.
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be public trusts.85 Yet efforts to extend fiduciary principles may vary in
their success, and the intentional dimension of fiduciary obligations can
explain why. In general, extensions of fiduciary concepts are most likely to
be fruitful in areas of law and politics where the imposition of intentional
requirements is independently plausible, and unfruitful in areas of law
where there is independent reason to believe that intentions do not or
should not matter. The normative structure of loyalty constrains these and
other efforts to theorize fiduciary obligations.
85. See EVAN FOX-DECENT, SOVEREIGNTY’S PROMISE: THE STATE AS FIDUCIARY (2011); Ethan J.
Leib, David L. Ponet & Michael Serota, Translating Fiduciary Principles into Public Law, 126
HARV. L. REV. F. 91 (2013); Evan Fox-Decent & Evan J. Criddle, The Fiduciary Constitution of
Human Rights, 15 LEGAL THEORY 301 (2009).
